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1.    Introduction 
 
In an integrated world, marginal cost differences are the driving force for 
outsourcing. Especially for Western European firms, the possibility of reducing 
production costs is a main factor of outsourcing to Eastern European or Asian 
countries.1 Attended with this fact, many people fear the consequences, i.e. the loss of 
employment or a wage reduction, especially for low-skilled workers. However, if 
outsourcing leads to cost reduction, the output price falls and induces a higher product 
demand. This scale effect may increase labour demand. Thus, the net employment effect 
of outsourcing is a priori ambiguous. Due to the actuality and importance of this topic 
there is  a growing amount of empirical  research relating to the impacts of outsourcing 
on labour market outcomes. Most of these studies as Geishecker (2006) or Görg and 
Hanley (2005) conclude that wages and employment of low-skilled workers decline, but 
on the other hand, high-skilled workers benefit from outsourcing at least in the short-
run. In long-run analyses, such as Amiti and Wei (2005, 2006) or Olsen et al. (2004), it 
is shown that the negative short-run employment effect can be dampened or offset by a 
labour demanding effect in other sectors. 
To avoid, at least in the short-run, the negative consequences, the labour market 
structure and the existence of a labour union with the power to avoid a wage decrease 
and/or to bargain with the firm over employment guarantees, play an important role. 
However, if the outsourced inputs are standard components and thus produced by low-
skilled worker, it can be assumed, that the firm is flexible enough to decide on the 
amount of outsourcing after the domestic low-skilled wage determination. Thus, if low-
skilled workers are represented by a labour union, outsourcing can be used as a threat to 
high domestic marginal production costs and will dampen the opportunity to realize a 
high wage level for this type of worker.2  
To work against the possible consequences of outsourcing, the domestic 
production has to become more attractive, i.e. lower marginal production costs or higher 
productivity are needed. Since both wages for high-skilled and low-skilled worker affect 
                                                             
1  See e.g. Holl (2008) or Rishi and Saxena (2004). 
2  Of course, also tasks performed by high-skilled labour can be outsourced, i.e. the “least qualified” 
among the high-skilled workers. However, to be simple, we assume that workers are homogenous 
within a group.   
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the marginal production cost, there are two components to reduce marginal costs. Since 
typically low-skilled workers in Western Europe are unionized, the first call is difficult 
to realize, at least for this group. However, the second call can be realized by 
introducing a profit sharing scheme3, which increases motivation and identification with 
the firm and thus stimulates effort respectively productivity and releases.  
Although, only high-skilled workers, such as managers, often realize profit 
sharing as part of their income4, profit sharing affects the wage determination for the 
high-skilled group and via the relationship of the labour inputs and the resulting profit 
effect also for the low-skilled workers.5 Therefore, profit sharing for high-skilled 
workers can enforce or dampen the fear concerning the consequences of outsourcing of 
low-skilled tasks.  
In this paper, we combine the research concerning the labour market effects of 
flexible outsourcing and profit sharing for high-skilled worker with individually effort 
determination. From our point of view this is an important research question, since most 
of the studies focus on the relationship of flexible outsourcing and direct wage 
payments and not on the relationship to profit dependent and thus not cost relevant wage 
components6, which are more and more used in the compensation schemes. Thus, our 
central  research  question  is:  How  does  the  implementation  of  profit  sharing  for  high-
skilled workers influence outsourcing activities and thus the labour market outcome for 
low-skilled worker? As profit sharing becomes more in focus of firms, unions and the 
political discussion, the implications of bonus payments if firms are only profit 
                                                             
3  For an increasing effect on productivity, see Cable and Fitzroy (1980), while Kruse (1993) 
demonstrate negative a productivity effect of profit sharing. 
4       Empirical studies as Pendleton et al. (2001) show that profit sharing is an important phenomenon 
in OECD countries.  
5  An intuitively explanation for the influence on the high-skilled wage is the opportunity to 
substitute the wage income by profit income, but due to the profit income it is possible to generate 
the same income. Assuming that the wages for profit sharing recipients are set by a trade union, i.e. 
Holmlund (1990) or Weitzman (1987) show theoretically the wage decreasing effect of profit 
sharing. In contrast, the empirical evidence is ambiguous. See i.e. Black and Lynch (2000) for 
lower regular pay, while Wadhwani and Wall (1990) show that profit sharing does not reduce the 
wage.    
6  For an overview about the relationship between outsourcing and wage bargaining see i.e. Perry 
(1997). Concerning the effects of flexible outsourcing on wage setting see Skaksen (2004), which 
shows that the domestic bargained wage depends positively on outsourcing costs, and Braun and 
Scheffel (2007b), which find that the costs of outsourcing have an ambiguous effect on the 
bargained wage. However, they abstracted from the heterogeneity of the labour force. The effects 
of outsourcing when labour is heterogeneous is analysed by Davidson et al. (2008), but  they 
concentrate on labour market frictions that arise with search, while we focus on the role of labour 
unions in the case of low-skilled wage formation. Assuming homogeneous labour, König and 
Koskela (2011) focus on the relationship of profit sharing and labour market outcome for 
unionized work force. They find that in general the effects are ambiguous.   
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orientated has to be analysed from a theoretical point of view by analyzing the different 
effects and support or confute the public opinion at least on the firm level.  
We analyze these questions in a partial equilibrium model in which we assume 
that low-skilled workers are unionized, while high-skilled workers are not represented 
and thus their wages are determined by market forces. Furthermore, we assume that 
profit sharing is a commitment and therefore an optional offer, which is optimally set by 
the firm of the firm.7 In this specification8, we find that the profit participation has an 
individual  effort  augmenting  effect  for  high-skilled  workers  and  thus  raises  the  firm’s  
profit, which increases the labour demand. Due to the complementary relationship of 
labour types, this opens the opportunity for the labour union to pick up a higher share of 
this profit by demanding a higher wage for low-skilled workers. Thus, for a constant 
high-skilled wage, profit sharing leads to lower wage dispersion in a firm. Since profit 
sharing will increase the low-skilled wage and thus marginal domestic costs, it has an 
indirect enhancing effect on outsourcing activities. However, the employment effects of 
profit sharing for both types of labour are ambiguous. On the one hand, there is a labour 
augmenting effect via higher effort, but on the other hand there is a labour reducing 
effect via the induced wage increase for low-skilled workers.  
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the framework and investigates the 
model in terms of labour and outsourcing demand and employee effort, while section 3 
concentrates on the low-skilled wage formation and the employment effects. Section 4 
concludes briefly. 
 
2.    Basic Framework 
 
We analyse in a model with heterogeneous domestic workers, i.e. a dual domestic 
labour market, flexible international outsourcing and committed profit sharing. The 
production combines effective high-skilled worker services and unskilled worker 
                                                             
7  Fung (1989) assumes that profit sharing is implemented by law, but to our knowledge only in 
France exists an obligatory profit share system. However, the level of the share will be determined 
in the bargaining round between the firm and the labor union.   
8  Of course, our assumptions are specific, since one could also image that the union presents both 
types of workers to the same degree and profit sharing is a result of the bargaining and shared with 
all employees. However, we focus only on the question if the profit dependence of the income for 
high-skilled workers is a reason for more outsourcing of low skilled tasks. Thus, and to keep the 
analysis simple, we neglect the above mentioned modifications. 
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services. Effective skilled employment is a combination of absolute skilled employment 
and the effort by skilled workers, i.e. their productivity. Following empirical studies, we 
assume that low-skilled workers and outsourcing activities are substitutes, so that low-
skilled labour services can be provided either by the firm’s own workers, or obtained 
from abroad through international outsourcing.  
Using the described specification in the introduction, the analysed timing 
sequence of the decisions is summarized in Figure 1.   
 
                                            Figure 1: sequence of events 
 
      stage 1                          stage 2                              stage 3    
                                                                                                                         time 
      profit                       low-skilled wage         effort determination ( ie ), high-skilled and           
      sharing (? )             setting ( Lw )               low-skilled labor demand ( H and )L , and 
                                                                          outsourcing  ( M )   
 
 
Note that this timing decision implies that profit sharing is assumed to be committed 
at stage 1 and at stage 2 conditional on profit sharing, the labour union determines the 
wage for the unskilled workers by taking into account how this affects the demand for 
labour and outsourcing by the firm. At stage 3, the representative firm decides on 
domestic employment and international outsourcing. The wage of the skilled labor 
adjusts to the constant world market level and given for the firm, moreover, the 
representative skilled worker decides on effort provision given this wage level and the 
profit share and thus, knowing the earning components. If the earnings components are 
known, the representative high-skilled worker decides on effort provision at stage 3. 
Therefore, the structure of actions can be interpreted as sequential decisions on three 
stages, were the decisions are analysed by using backward induction. 
 
1.1 Labour and Outsourcing Demand 
At the last stage, the representative high-skilled worker decides the effort ie  and 
the representative firm decides the high-skilled labour demand H , the low-skilled 
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labour demand L , and outsourcing M .  Assuming  that  the  price  of  the  final  good  is  
normalized to unity9, the firm decides domestic labour demand and outsourcing to 
maximize the profit function 
  
? ? ? ?MfLwHwMLHeF LHMHL ???? ,,max;; ? ,                                           (1) 
 
by taking the average skilled worker’s effort e , the low-skilled and high-skilled wages, 
Lw  and Hw , as well as profit share ? , as given.10 The average effort is defined as 
?
?
?
H
i
ieH
e
1
1 , so that the impact of provision of an additional unit of effort by a single 
worker is 
He
e
i
1?
?
? .11  
In order to obtain M  units of outsourced low-skilled labour input, we assume that 
firms have to spend ? ? 25,0 cMMf ?  with ? ? 0' ?Mf  and ? ? 0'' ?Mf . This cost 
formulation reveals that there are some other costs associated with outsourcing such as 
the price the intermediate goods. Such costs could be costs for quality proofing or 
transport, which are exponential increasing with higher outsourcing. To allow for an 
exponential cost increase, we model a quadratic cost function.12 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas-type production function with decreasing returns to 
scale according to three inputs, i.e. ? ? ? ? ? ??? MLHeMLHeF ??,, ,  where  the  
parameters ?  and ?  are  assumed  to  satisfy the assumptions 0, ???  and 
01 ??? ?? .13 From the production function, we can derive the marginal products of 
skilled labour, unskilled labour and outsourcing 0?HF  and 0?? ML FF . For the 
                                                             
9  Combining this assumption with decreasing returns to scale, we ensure positive profits, which are 
needed for the existence of union wage bargaining. We do not focus on the simultaneous presence 
of imperfections in labour and product markets, and thus neglect changes in the product market. 
10  Notice, that the profit of the firm is ? ? ?? ??1 . However, due to the modeling of profit participation 
as a commitment, profit sharing works as a profit tax. Due to the neutrality of this kind of tax, also 
in the case of a bargained profit share the domestic labour demand does not depend on profit 
sharing. 
11         A specification, which is also common in the literature, describes effort as the fraction of working 
hours that the worker actually works. Since the number of working hours is normalized to 1, the 
choice of an individual is ? ?1;0?ie  and thus ? ?ie-1  characterizes the fraction of time spent 
shirking. Following this, He  is the whole actual working time.  
12         See e.g. Koskela and Stenbacka (2010). 
13  Koskela and Schöb (2010) use a similar formulation of the relationship between domestic labour 
and outsourcing. However, they abstract from high-skilled employment in the absence of dual 
labour markets and focus on the effects of labour taxation on outsourcing if firms are unionized. 
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cross derivatives we have 0?? HMHL FF  and   0?LMF . Taking these derivatives, we 
can conclude that for our type of production function the domestic skilled labour input 
and the outsourced or domestic unskilled labour input are complements, whereas the 
unskilled domestic labour input and the outsourced unskilled labour input are substitutes 
in terms of the marginal product effects of outsourcing.  
Using the marginal products we can calculate the first-order conditions 
characterizing the domestic skilled and unskilled labour demand and outsourcing 
activities as  
 
              0??? HH wFH
??                                                                                        (2a) 
0
)(
??
?
? LL wFML
??                                                                           (2b) 
0
)(
??
?
? cMF
MLM
?? .                                                                            (2c) 
 
The first-order conditions (2a) and (2b) imply the relationship between the skilled ? ?H  
and the unskilled labours, inclusive of outsourcing ? ?ML ? , as follows  
 
? ?ML
w
wH
H
L ?? ?
? .                                                                                        (3) 
 
Using (2b) and (2c) we get the demand for outsourcing as  
 
c
wM L? ,                                                                                                          (4) 
 
where 
M
wM
M
cM Lwc L??? 1 . According to equation (4) higher unskilled domestic wage 
rate and lower outsourcing costs will increase outsourcing. Substituting (3) into the 
production function and coming with (2b) gives the unskilled labour demand, which can 
be expressed as follows  
 
?
?
??
?
????? ????
c
wewmwMewmwL LHLHL
?????? ,                                                   (5) 
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where 0??? ?? ??m , 1
1
1 ?
??
?? ??
??  and 0
1
?
??
? ??
?? .  According  to  (5),  a  
more extensive outsourcing activity will decrease the low-skilled labour demand, which 
is consistent with empirical evidence. As we can see, higher own wage and cross wage 
and lower high-skilled effort will negatively affect the low-skilled labour demand. In 
the presence of outsourcing the direct own wage and cross wage elasticities of unskilled 
labour and the effort elasticity of the unskilled labour can be written as follows  
 
  ? ?
L
M
L
w
w
L L
L
L ?????
??? ??? 1                                                            (6a) 
?
?
??
?
? ???
?
??
?
????
L
M
L
e
e
L
L
w
w
L H
H
eH 1??? .                                       (6b) 
 
Of course, in the absence of outsourcing, the wage and effort elasticities are constant 
and smaller, i.e. ?? ??0ML   and  ?? ??0Me .  
Finally, substituting equation (5) into the relationship in equation (3) gives the 
labour demand for the high-skilled worker 
 
? ? ???
?
? ewwmH LH ???? 11 ,                                                                                     (7) 
 
where ? ? 1
1
11 ???
????? ??
??
H
wH HwH  and ? ? 0
1
1 ???????? ??
??
H
wH LwL . 
Unlike in low-skilled labour case, these elasticities from profit function (1) are 
independent of outsourcing.  
 
1.2  Effort Formation and Direct Employment Effects for Skilled Workers  
 
Effort Determination of Skilled Workers  
As  we  mentioned,  profit  sharing  can  stimulates  workers  effort.  However,  if  the  
profit share is equally distributed between n  employees, there could be a free rider 
problem, since an individual receives only n/1  of the extra profit and thus there is an 
incentive for shirking. In the discussion of the free-rider problem, interactions of the 
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group member and peer pressure are often neglected. Due to the implementation of 
profit sharing there are incentives in the group to internalize the externalities of free-
riding and avoiding shirking, since it sets some incentives to observe each other and 
interact.14 This can build up peer pressure to provide the individual effort resulting from 
individual utility maximization and eliminate the moral hazard problem concerning 
free-rider behaviour. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992), we motivate this peer 
pressure as a group norm. Due to the observation, the individual feels shame or guilt if 
the individual effort is below this norm, i.e. if the individual shirks, since it lowers the 
income for each team member. Due to this shame, the individual realizes a loss of 
utility. However, an effort above the norm will also decrease the individual utility, since 
now the other team member will feel shame. Thus, any deviation from the norm will 
lead to a utility loss and can be interpreted as a punishment.15 Since any deviation from 
the group norm decreases the individual utility, we model the peer pressure function as 
a quadratic function, which can in simple form be written as ? ? ? ?2~ ii eeeP ?? , where e~  
is the social norm and defined as the average effort of all other workers than i . 
Modelling the utility of the individual, we assume that the utility function is 
additively separable and depends positive on income and negative on disutility of effort 
and peer pressure. The remuneration includes the wage income Hw  and  the  profit  
income 
H
?? ? . Thus, the idea behind this is that high-skilled workers are assumed to be 
a team. The whole team gets the profit income ?? ? , which is distributed equally among 
the members. However, to get the profit income, it causes effort provision of a worker. 
Since the worker dislikes effort provision, it is associated with a disutility, which can be 
described by the convex function ? ? ?? /1eeg ??  with 10 ?? ?  so that ? ? 0' ?eg  and 
? ? 0'' ?eg .  
Using these assumptions, we can formalize the utility function for an employed 
worker in a profit sharing firm in (8a) and (8b) in a firm, where is no profit sharing  
                                                             
14  See the analysis by Holmstrom (1982), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Varian (1990). Radner 
(1986) shows, that in repeated games under certain conditions the free-rider problem can be 
eliminated even if the players cannot observe other players’ actions or information, but can only 
observe the resulting consequences. 
15  Note that this punishment is a utility loss and not an income loss, where the utility loss can be 
interpreted as mental harassment or social exclusion.  
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? ?2/1 ~ iiH eeeHwv ??????
???? ,                                                                 (8a) 
                  Hwv ? ,                                                                                              (8b) 
 
which means that the outside option of the high-skilled workers is the market wage Hw . 
Therefore high-skilled workers get anywhere the same wage. However, the skilled jobs 
will be different with respect to their job characteristics due to the existence of a profit 
sharing system. 
A worker’s problem is to choose the level of individual effort to maximize its 
utility. For simplicity we assume within this framework, that every group member can 
verify costless the effort of the others, but the firm owner cannot do this. Furthermore, 
we assume Nash-behaviour, where every worker chooses his/her effort taking the effort 
of others as given. So there is no effect of effort provision by other workers and thus the 
social norm is not affected by individual effort, i.e. 0
~
??
?
ie
e  (see also Lin et al., 2002). 
The optimal individual provided effort level results from individual utility maximization 
of (8a) with respect to effort, which yields the first-order condition16 
 
? ? ? ?eee
H
v ee ???? ? ~21/1 ??
? .                                                                         (9) 
 
Since we focus on individual effort determination, the effect on employment will be not 
taken into account. Therefore, ee F?*?  holds. Using the production function, the 
definition ?
?
?
H
i
ieH
e
1
1  and the labour demand for low-skilled and high-skilled workers, 
we find for the individual effect on profit ewF Hee /??? . 
Remember, that the group norm is defined as the observable average effort of all 
other team members. Assuming Nash-behaviour, where every worker takes the effort of 
the others as given, in the equilibrium, the individual chosen effort level equals the 
group norm, which corresponds to the average effort level of all other group members. 
Finally, we have ee ~? . Therefore, for identical workers, the individual effort also 
                                                             
16  The index i  has been dropped for notational convenience. 
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equals the average effort level and effort level which would be chosen without any peer 
pressure. Using this, we get from solving equation (9)  
 
?? ?
?
??
?
? ???
H
wee H .                                                                                 (10) 
 
Therefore, the optimal effort by the representative skilled worker is influenced by the 
income parts, but outsourcing will have no direct effect. From (10) it is easy to see that 
for 0??  no effort will provided so that concerning our production function this means 
that output falls to zero. Therefore, we assume 10 ?? ? .  
Since changes in low-skilled wage and profit income affect all skilled workers, 
each skilled worker will adjust its effort and thus the average effort will change. These 
effects we derive by taking the differential of effort function (10). Here, we find 
0?
Ldw
ed  and  0??d
ed  (see Appendix A), so that the low-skilled wage and profit sharing 
enhance productivity by increasing effort provision and positively affect labour demand 
indirectly, which lies in conformity with empirics.17 Since higher low-skilled wage 
reduces low-skilled employment due to the complementary relationship of the two types 
of labour, the high-skilled employment also decreases. However, decreasing high-
skilled employment raises the effort provision of an employed skilled worker, since the 
influence of an individual worker on profit increases and he/she provides more effort.  
We can now summarize our findings as follows. 
 
Proposition 1:  
Profit income and low-skilled wage have an individual effort augmenting 
effect and thus increase productivity. 
 
Important  for  the  next  analysis  is  the  effort  elasticity  of  low-skilled  wage.  In  our  
framework we find ? ???
??? ??
????
1
1
e
w
dw
ed L
L
, where 10 ???  (see Appendix A). This 
means, that the low-skilled wage setting by the labour union is binding. 
                                                             
17       See e.g. Booth and Frank (1999) or Cable and Wilson (1990).  
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Also the effect  of  high-skilled wage on effort  provision can be illustrated.  Here 
we find the intuitive result that 0?
Hdw
ed .  A  special  feature  is  to  examine  the  effort  
elasticity in terms of high-skilled wage to study whether the Solow-condition is valid. 
Using our results, we find ? ???
??
??
???
1
2
e
w
dw
ed H
H
, so that the elasticity of effort in terms 
of high-skilled wage is only one, if we have the specific parameter 2/1??  for the 
disutility of effort.18 Ensuring a binding market clearing high-skilled wage, we have to 
assume that 2/1?? . Thus the classical efficiency wage argument does not hold in our 
framework.  
 
Direct Employment Effects for Skilled Workers  
Since we assume a constant skilled wage Hw , the employment of high-skilled 
workers is described by equation (7). Thus, we can determine the direct employment 
effects of low-skilled wage and profit sharing by taking into account the effects of effort 
provision.   
The low-skilled wage affects the high-skilled labour demand in a direct and an 
indirect way. If the low-skilled wage increases the high-skilled labour demand decreases 
due to the complementarity between both labour types, while the indirect mechanism is 
the opposite effect via effort, because higher low-skilled wage leads to higher effort, 
which increases high-skilled labour demand. Formally, the influence of the low-skilled 
wage on the employment of the high-skilled workers can be presented as 
??
?
??
? ??
???
???
e
w
dw
ed
H
e
e
H
H
w
w
H
w
H
dw
dH L
L
L
LLL
, which can be solved by using 
????
? 1
H
w
w
H L
L
, ???
?
H
e
e
H
 and ??
e
w
dw
ed L
L
to (for the sign see Appendix A) 
 
? ? 01 ?????? ???
LL w
H
dw
dH ,                                                                          (11) 
 
                                                             
18      The same result is obtained by Jellal and Zenou (2000) in a dynamic efficiency wage model 
without outsourcing.   
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so that there is a negative relationship between the low-skilled wage and the 
employment of the high-skilled workers and the direct complementary effect dominates 
the indirect effort effect.  
Profit sharing affects the high-skilled labour demand only via the provided effort. 
Since higher profit share enhances effort provision, which high-skilled labour demand, 
there is a positive direct relationship between high-skilled employment and profit 
sharing. Differentiating (7) with respect to profit sharing gives  
 
0?????
?
??
? ??
??? ???
?
???
H
ed
ed
H
e
e
HH
d
dH .                                                        (12)  
 
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the skilled employment 
in the presence of outsourcing as follows. 
 
Proposition 2:  
In the presence of flexible outsourcing   
a) the wage for unskilled workers affects a firm’s demand for high-
skilled  workers in two ways, directly due to complementarity of inputs 
and indirectly due to induced higher effort, where the direct effect 
dominates and higher low-skilled wage reduces skilled employment 
and 
b) profit sharing affects the skilled worker demand of a firm only 
indirectly due to the effort channel, where the induced positive effort 
effect of profit sharing increases the high-skilled labour demand.  
 
These results are intuitive in our setting. Higher low-skilled wage will affect the high-
skilled labour demand via two channels. The first is the negative direct wage effect, 
which leads to a lower high-skilled demand because of the complementary relationship 
between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. However, this will increase the effort, 
which increases the high-skilled labour demand. This describes the second channel, 
which is a positive indirect effect. In our analysis the direct effect dominates and thus 
higher low-skilled wage will reduce the high-skilled labour demand. 
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The positive direct effect of profit sharing can be explained as follows. Higher 
profit sharing will increase the effort, which leads for given wage level to a higher 
productivity, which increases the labour demand. 
 
3.    Low-skilled Wage Formation and Employment Effects  
 
We analyse the wage formation by the monopoly labour union, which determines 
the wage for low-skilled workers in anticipation of optimal in-house unskilled labour 
demand, flexible outsourcing and the high-skilled effort and employment.  
 
Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labour Union 
The objective function of the labour union of unskilled workers is assumed to be 
? ? NbLbwV LLL ????? , where Lb  is the (exogenous) outside option available for 
unskilled workers and N  is the number of labour union members. The monopoly 
labour  union  sets  the  wage  for  the  unskilled  workers  so  as  to maximize the surplus 
according to  
 
? ? NbLbwV LLLwL ?????max                                                                        (13) 
 s.t. ?
?
??
?
??? ??
c
wewmwL LHL
???                                   
 
The first-order condition associated with problem (13) is  
 
? ? 0???
?
??
? ???
L
L
LLL
L
w dw
dL
L
wbww
w
LV
L
,                                                         (14)   
 
where the total unskilled wage elasticity of low-skilled labour demand is 
eL
L
L
L
L
L
L e
w
dw
ed
L
e
e
L
L
w
w
L
L
w
dw
dL ???? ????
???
????? . . Using this and simplifying the 
first-order condition (14) we get  
 
             LLHL bebwcw ???
?
???
?
?? 1),,,,( ?
?? .                                                                   (15) 
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Note, that here this unskilled labour demand elasticity is not constant, because the 
unskilled labour demand depends negatively on the high-skilled wage and the unskilled 
wage but positively on effort and the costs of outsourcing and thus, equation (15) is an 
implicit formulation with 1??  (see Appendix B) respectively 1)1/( ???? . 
In order to focus on our main aim, to determine the effect of bonus payments for 
high-skilled worker on the unskilled wage formation, we therefore apply the implicit 
differentiation (for the details see Appendix B). Differentiating the wage equation (15) 
with respect to the unskilled wage and the profit gives 
 
 0
1
?
??
??
?
??
??
?
? L
L
L
L
w
dw
d
w
d
d
d
dw ,                                                                         (16) 
 
and differentiating (15) with respect to the unskilled wage and outsourcing costs gives, 
 
0
1
?
??
??
?
??
?
?
L
L
L
L
w
dw
d
w
dc
d
dc
dw ,                                                                         (17) 
 
where 0?
Ldw
d? , 0?
dc
d?  and 0??
?
d
d .  Therefore,  a  higher  low-skilled  wage  will  
increase the total wage elasticity of domestic unskilled labour demand and higher 
outsourcing  costs  and  profit  share  will  decrease  the  total  wage  elasticity  of  domestic  
low-skilled labour demand.19 Thus, we can conclude that outsourcing cost and profit 
sharing raise the low-skilled wage. 
Knowing this, we are able to find an answer to the question if the implementation 
of profit sharing for high-skilled workers raise or lower outsourcing activities. 
Differentiating (4) in terms of profit sharing gives  
 
?
01 ??
?
?? d
dw
cd
dM L                                                                                             (18) 
 
                                                             
19       See Senses (2010), who provide empirical evidence for this result.  
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so that the effect of outsourcing activities is driven by the effect on low-skilled wage, 
which is positive. 
We can summarize our findings concerning the effects of outsourcing costs and 
profit sharing on low-skilled wage, which also determines the effect of profit sharing on 
outsourcing. 
 
Proposition 3:  
In the presence of flexible outsourcing 
a) lower costs of outsourcing decreases the wage for low-skilled labour 
and 
b) higher profit sharing for the skilled workers has a positive effect on the 
wage for unskilled labour, whereas 
c) higher profit sharing for the skilled workers has an indirect enhancing 
effect on outsourcing. 
 
Higher profit sharing increases profit and the skilled labour demand. Since the labour 
inputs are assumed to be complements, the low-skilled labour demand also raises. Thus, 
the union’s marginal costs of an increasing wage are smaller via less dismissals and the 
union can set a higher wage by reaping a higher share of the increased profit. But the 
wage enhancing effect will also induce a higher outsourcing demand, which can be 
explained by the substitutability of domestic low-skilled labour services and foreign 
intermediate goods.  
Lower outsourcing costs mean for a given low-skilled wage level a higher 
outsourcing demand and low-skilled labour demand becomes more elastic. Due to this 
fact, the union’s marginal costs of a higher wage increases and therefore lower 
outsourcing costs induces a less aggressive wage setting to avoid outsourcing and to 
make integrated production more attractive.20  
Knowing  the  low-skilled  wage  effect  of  profit  sharing,  we  can  also  look  at  the  
relationship of the wage levels and thus on the impact of wage dispersion in a firm. 
Since it is reasonable to assume that LH ww ? , where Hw  is constant from a single 
firm’s view, we can conclude  
                                                             
20  This lies in conformity with empirics, see evidence from various countries, e.g. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) or Braun and Scheffel (2007a). 
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Corollary 1:  
Profit sharing for high-skilled workers decreases due to a higher wage sets 
by the low-skilled labour union the wage dispersion in a firm. 
 
This is an interesting and not expected feature since due to the possibility of flexible 
outsourcing the low-skilled worker comes under wage pressure. However, our analysis 
shows that introducing profit sharing increases the wage for low-skilled workers, since 
the union can act more aggressive due to the labour augmenting effort effect. Because 
we assume a single firm and a given wage for high-skilled workers, thus profit sharing 
leads to a lower wage gap in that single firm.  
 
Overall Employment Effects  
Up to now we have only analyzed the direct employment effects of profit sharing. 
For  the  sake  of  completeness  we  will  now  demonstrate  the  overall  effects  of  profit  
sharing for the employment, taking into account the effect on the low-skilled wage.  
The effect of profit sharing on low-skilled employment can be characterized as 
 
?? ??
?
?
? ???
??
?
??
?
?? ????
??? d
dw
dw
dL
d
ed
e
LL L
L
 with 0????
LL w
L
dw
dL ? .                                  (19) 
 
The first term in equation (19) describes the positive effect of profit sharing on low-
skilled labour demand, because higher profit sharing induces higher effort, which leads 
to an increase in high-skilled labour employment and due to the complementarity of the 
inputs also to an increase in low-skilled labour demand. The second term in equation 
(19) describes the negative effect of profit sharing on low-skilled labour demand, 
because higher profit sharing increases the opportunity for the trade union to set a 
higher wage. Due to this increase in low-skilled labour costs, the firm will engage more 
in outsourcing and demand less low-skilled labour. Thus we have two opposed low-
skilled labour effects of a profit sharing scheme for high-skilled workers, where the 
overall effect is ambiguous. From this we can conclude, that it is possible to observe on 
the one hand more outsourcing but on the other hand also higher low-skilled 
employment if the low-skilled wage increases due to profit sharing.                                             
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Similarly, we can also determine the overall high-skilled employment effect. By 
using equation (7) the overall effect of profit sharing on high-skilled employment is 
 
? ??
?
?
? ???
?
??? ???
??? d
dw
dw
dH
d
dHH L
L
.                                                                              (20) 
 
From equation (20) we see that higher profit sharing has also an ambiguous overall 
effect on high-skilled employment. The first term, which corresponds to equation (12), 
describes the known enhancing high-skilled employment effect via the effort provision, 
while the second term describes the negative effect via the increasing effect on the low-
skilled wage, which induces a decrease in the low-skilled labour demand and, due to the 
complementarity of the inputs, also a decrease in the high-skilled labour demand as 
pointed out in equation (11). Therefore, the high-skilled employment effect also consists 
of two opposed effects, where the overall effect is ambiguous.   
 
Proposition 4:  
In the presence of flexible outsourcing profit sharing affects a firm’s 
demand for high-skilled and low-skilled workers via two opposed effects. 
The first is the effort effect, which enhances the labour demand, whereas the 
low-skilled wage effect as the second working channel decreases the labour 
demand.  
 
As our last results pointed out, it is possible that implementing a profit sharing scheme 
for high-skilled workers decreases the wage gap in a firm without losing low-skilled 
employment, if the induced substitution effect concerning higher low-skilled wage can 
be offset by the effort effect. Since bonus payments for high-skilled workers must not 
lead in any case to lower employment of low-skilled workers, such a compensation 
scheme is not as bad as it is seen in the public opinion, which argue that due to the 
dependence of the income on profits managers pursuit the strategy of the highest-
profit, which is one reason for increasing outsourcing and lower low-skilled 
employment, if the domestic low-skilled labour is represented by a labour union.  
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4.     Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have tried to describe a framework of flexible outsourcing in a 
partly unionized dual labour market. In Western European countries we often observe 
that, unlike low-skilled workers, who are organized in labour unions, high-skilled wages 
are mostly determined competitively. However, high-skilled workers could also directly 
participate in the firm’s success via profit sharing, which also affects the wage 
determination of low-skilled labour and also the outsourcing demand. Since especially 
low-skilled worker fears the consequences, i.e. lower wages and dismissal, of 
international outsourcing we focus on the relationship of to profit dependent 
remuneration  parts  on  the  labour  market  outcome  of  low-skilled  workers  and  thus  
concerning these consequences.   
In our analyses we have shown that the wage of the low-skilled workers will be 
positively affected by outsourcing costs and profit sharing for high-skilled workers. 
Since the high-skilled wage is constant and higher than the low-skilled wage, thus 
higher outsourcing costs and profit sharing reduce the wage dispersion in a single firm. 
Also, we find that the effect of profit sharing on outsourcing activities is indirect 
negatively via the low-skilled wage. Finally, we characterized the employment effects 
of profit sharing. Here we find that profit sharing induces higher low-skilled and high-
skilled labour demand via increased effort, but on the other hand decreases the labour 
demand for both types via the higher low-skilled wage. Thus the employment effects are 
ambiguous. In what follows, under certain circumstances, bonus payments for high-
skilled  worker  helps  to  realize  the  aims  of  adequate  wage  and  high  employment  level  
for low-skilled workers in a certain firm and can dampen the negative labour market 
consequences of outsourcing of low-skilled tasks.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Comparative Statics of Effort Effects 
Differentiating the effort function (10) with respect to effort and low-skilled wage gives  
Lw
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e
HH dwH
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,                  
(A1) 
By  using  equation  (7)  we  have  H
e
H e ??
?  and ? ?
L
w w
HH
L
??? 1   so  that  we  can  
simplify (A1) to 
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? ? 0
1
1 ??
??
???
LL w
e
dw
ed
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?? ,                                                                             (A2) 
where 1
1
1 ?
??
?? ??
?? .  For  the  effort  elasticity  with  respect  to  the  low-skilled  wage  
we have ? ? 1
1
10 ?
??
??? ??
??? . This holds since we rewrite this term to 
????
???
???
?
1
. Because our assumptions 01 ??? ?? , 0; ???  and ? ?1;0??  we 
have ? ?1;0?? . For the high-skilled employment effect of higher low-skilled wage, we 
need  the  sign  of  ??? ???1 . Using our results for ?  we  can  rewrite  this  term  to  
? ? ? ? ??
????
??
?????
1
11  which leads to ? ? 0
1
1 ?
??
?? ??
? .  
                             
Appendix B: Effects of Parameters on Low-Skilled Wage 
The total wage elasticity of low-skilled labour demand is 
? ? 11 ?????????
L
M
eL ??????????  as one can show that ??? ?  and therefore 
also 01 ??? ??? . 
Differentiating  the  implicit  wage  formation  (15)  with  respect  to  profit  share  and  the  
unskilled wage gives   
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1?? LL
wb  (see equation (15)) expressed as 
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Similarly, we find for differentiating the implicit wage formation (15) with respect to 
the outsourcing cost and the unskilled wage 
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with ???? ????? eLL
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w
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QED. 
 
